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TAXATION OF VALUE OF LODGING FURNISHED AN
EMPLOYEE FOR HIS EMPLOYER'S CONVENIENCE:
REQUIRED REIMBURSEMENTS
IN J. Melvin Boykin,' the Tax Court required petitioner to include in
his taxable income amounts withheld from his salary representing the
value of living quarters on his employer's premises,' even though the
Commissioner conceded that the employee was required to live
on the premises for the employer's convenience. The Tax Court
based its decision on Treasury Regulation I.II9-I(c)(2), a which dis-
tinguishes between the value of lodging for which the employee is
required to reimburse the employer and the value of lodging furnished
by the employer for which the employee is not required to reimburse
his employer,4 including only the former in taxable income. Although
'P-H 1958 TAX C. REP. & MEM. DEC. 29.88. As this issue went to press, the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision in the Boykin case,
employing reasoning similar to that advocated in this note. CCH 1958 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. I 9900.
'Petitioner was a physician employed by the Veterans Administration during 1954
and 1955 and occupied personal living quarters on the grounds of the hospital.
Quarters were owned and rented by the Veterans Administration. Petitioner was
required to live on the hospital grounds in order to properly perform the duties of his
employment. The Veterans Administration withheld $1147.46 in 1954. and $x,88.86
in 1955 as rental charges for quarters occupied by petitioner based on fair rental
value of quarters by local appraisers. See J. Melvin Boykin, P-H 1958 TAx Cr.
REP. & MEm. DEC. 29.88.
' "The exclusion provided by section i 19 applies only to meals and lodging furnished
in kind, without charge or cost to the employee. If the employee has an option to
receive additional compensation in lieu of meals or lodging in kind, or is required to
reimburse the employer for meals or lodging furnished in kind, the value of such
meals and lodging is not excluded from gross income .... Cash allowances for meals
or lodging received by an employee are includible in gross income to the extent that
such allowances constitute compensation." Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(C)(2) (1954).
'The following statement of the Tax Court indicates why it thinks the regulation
was justified: "The legislative history of section z19 gives no indication that Congress
gave any thought to the exclusion from income of the value of lodgings for which the
employer charged the employee the fair rental value. . . . The legislative history of
section 519 indicates rather clearly that Congress was thinking only about the
exclusion from income of the value of meals and lodging furnished without charge to
the employee by the employer.' 3. Melvin Boykin, P-H 1958 TAx CT. REP. & MaiEM.
DEC. 29.88. This reasoning seems open to question, however. If Congress did not fore-
see a situation such as that which occurred in the Boykin case, the case should perhaps have
been disposed of on the basis of the purpose for which section i 19 of the Internal Revenue
Code was enacted. Legislatures cannot forsee every problem that will arise under
statutes, but this does not mean that every unforeseen circumstance is automatically
beyond the preview of the statute. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCION §
5102 (3 d ed. x943).
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the regulation further provides that cash allowances5 for meals and
lodgings are includible in income to the extent that they constitute
compensation, the deficiency letter which the Treasury wrote petitioner
stated that the value of the lodging was being included in income be-
cause it was not paid for out of a cash allowance, implying that cash
allowances are not includible in income if they satisfy the requirements
of section ii9 of the Internal Revenue Code. If this letter correctly
states the Treasury's position, an anomalous situation has been created,
for application of regulation I.I19-1 (c) (2) may result in the levying
of a tax upon gross economic benefit received in one instance and net
economic benefit received in another instance, each determination hinging
upon a simple matter of form rather than any substantive difference.
By way of illustration:
Employee A is employed by X hospital at a salary of $1250 per
month. He is required to live on the hospital premises as a
condition of employment. The value of his lodgings is $250
per month.
As the law now stands, there are three ways in which employee A might
be paid:
'A cash allowance may be defined as a form of remuneration in which the total cash
received by the employee is apportioned between conventional salary and an allowance
paid in cash to be used for a specific purpose, e.g. meals and lodging. The employer
may require the employee to reimburse the employer to the extent of the amount
denominated as cash allowance, or the employee may have an option to receive the
allowance in lieu of meals or lodging. In the former case, the allowance would more
than likely be excludible since the convenience of the employer test would be met.
The latter, or option, form of cash allowance is obviously for the convenience of the
employee and would thus be includible in income.
' "This amount represents the total payments that you made to your employer in
order to pay him for a share of the lodging that he rented to you.
"We are disallowing this deduction because you did not make these payments
to your employer out of a cash allowance that you specifically received for lodging."
J. Melvin Boykin, P-H 1958 TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 29.88.
'Section 119 allows a taxpayer to exclude the value of meals and lodging from
taxable income if it is for the convenience of the employer, on the business premises
of the employer, and must be accepted by the employee as a condition of employment.
Since all of these conditions were met in the Boykin case, the Treasury apparently felt
that they could not include a cash allowance in taxable income under the statute.
An additional factor which may have influenced the Treasury to take this position
as to cash allowances is the case of Saunders v. Comm., 215 F.zd 768 ( 3d cir. 1954),
reversing, R. H. Saunders, 21 T.C. 630 (1954), where the court said: "Because the
result in this case should not be dependent on whether meals are furnished in cash or
in kind, we may refer to the principle of convenience of employer rule in deciding
the classification of this cash allowance just as we may when meals are furnished."





A may receive the value of lodgings as part of his salary and
be required to reimburse his employer for the value of lodg-
ings so received. Under this arrangement, A would receive
$i25o a month and refund $25o to his employer.
For administrative expediency, X may simply withhold the
value of lodgings from A's salary, as in the Boykin case, leav-
ing A with a take home pay of $iooo out of his $I25o salary.
A would be taxed on $I25O in either situation.
B. Cash Allowance:
The taxpayer may receive the value of lodgings as a cash
allowance. A would thus receive $iooo as salary and $250 as
a cash allowance which he would have to pay X for the
accommodations. This cash allowance is excludible, and A
would be taxed on only $iooo.
II. Compensation in Kind.
A may receive the net amount of his salary, $ooo, in one pay-
ment. There would be neither a required reimbursement
nor a cash allowance, but A would receive the same net take
home pay and would be taxed on only $Iooo.
The problem thus presented has a controversial and somewhat
confused background. Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the
Treasury wavered between an unadulterated economic benefit theory
and the more liberal convenience of employer theory which was in-
corporated into the 1954 Code. Originally the Board of Tax Appeals,
following Treasury Regulations, held that since a taxpayer was better
off financially by receiving free meals and lodging, such economic
benefits should be classified as additional compensation. s These hold-
ings were modified in Jones v. United States,9 where the Court of Claims
drew a distinction between allowances and compensation, holding that
the rental value of an army officer's quarters was a tax free allowance
a ,€... A was paid a regular salary of X and, in addition, his employer furnished him
without charge the use of a house having a rental value for A's purposes of Y. It was
recognized that A was better off financially for having received free lodging from his
employer, and the fair rental value of such free lodging was regarded as additional
compensation and included in his taxable income2' J. Melvin Boykin, P-H x958 TAX
Cr. REP. & MEm. DEc. 29.88. See also Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934)
Percy M. Chandler, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940); Reynard Corp., 3o B.T.A. 451 (x934).
" 6o Ct. Cl. 552 (2925).
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and not compensation. The decision was based on the court's conclusion
that occupancy of government quarters by officers was requisite to the
proper performance of their duties.1
Following the Jones decision, the Commissioner promulgated
Treasury Regulation 118,11 which stated that the value of free lodging
was excludible from taxable income if the lodging was granted the
employee primarily for the convenience of the employer, and not
exdudible if the lodging was granted as compensation for services. 12
This regulation was found to be very difficult to apply, and hence the
cases are in hopeless conflict as to whether lodging is compensatory in
nature, primarily for the convenience of the employer, or both.,3 This
confusion made it necessary to modify regulation i 18.
In 1950 the Treasury promulgated the much criticized Mimeograph
6472)14 which relegated the convenience of the employer test to a mere
10 The Jones decision marked the advent of the exclusion of cash allowances for
lodging. For subsequent applications of the Jones case see CCH i958 STAN. FED.
TAX REP. 1191.0711-.0714.
" "If a person receives as compensation for services rendered a salary and in addi-
tion thereto living quarters or meals, the value to such person of the quarters and meals
so furnished contitutes income subject to tax. If, however, living quarters or meals
are furnished to employees for the convenience of the employer, the value thereof
need not be computed and added to the compensation otherwise received by the em-
ployees.' McDermott, Meals and Lodging Under the z954 Code, 53 MICH. L. REV.
87!, 872 (1955).
*5 C... [T]he value of meals and lodging are includible in the employee's income
... if there is an indication that the meals and lodging were taken into consideration
in establishing the salary- paid2 Erbacher, Meals or Lodging Furnished for Con-
venience of Employer, 31 TAXEs 826, 827 (1954).
"' Several cases which illustrate the confusion under Regulation 118 are: R. D.
Bartilson, 13 TCM 1117 (1949). "Radio operator ... elected to have food furnished
by his employer, who also furnished taxpayer's lodging, instead of receiving $40 per
month to buy his own food. The value of the food and lodging was taxable as
compensation, since there was no conclusive evidence that they were furnished for the
convenience of the employer." CCH 1958 STAN. FED. TAx REP. 1191-04.
Henry M. Lees, 12 TCM 472 (1949). "The value of housing furnished a
construction supervisor who was required to be near the construction was not compensa-
tion includible in income since it was for convenience of employer2 CCH 1958 STAN.
FED. TAx REP. 119i.o585.
Chandler v. Comm. 119 F.2d 623 ( 3 d Cir. 1941). "Rental value of lodge,
occupied rent-free by taxpayer and his family, . . . represent taxable compensation."
CCH x958 STAN. FED. TAX REP. 1 i1p.o665. See also Hazel M. Carmichael, 7 TCM
278 (1948).
'a "The convenience of the employer rule is simply an administrative test to be
applied only in cases in which the compensatory character of such benefits is not otherwise
determinable. It follows that the rule should not be applied in any case in which it is
evident from other circumstances involved that the receipt of quarters or meals by the
employee represents compensation for services rendered. Mina. 6472, 1950-1 CUM.
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administrative gauge to be applied only when the compensatory char-
acter of the benefits could not be determined from all the surrounding
circumstances. In effect, the economic benefit test had been reinstated.'5
The situation was confused again, however, when the Second Circuit
refused to recognize Mimeograph 6472.16
Section ii9 of the 1954 Code overruled Mimeograph 6472 and
effectively restored the convenience of the employer test. Under sec-
tion ii9, three requirements must be satisfied before a taxpayer may
exclude the value of lodging from his taxable income: lodging must be
furnished for the convenience of the employer; 17 lodging must be on
the business premises of the employer;"' and the employee must be
required to accept such lodging as a condition of employment. 9 The
Senate Finance Committee Report stated that the basic test for exclusion
BULL. 15. See also McDermott, Meals and Lodging Under the x954 Code, 53 MICH.
L. RFv. 871 (xs5).
1"In 195o the Treasury definitely espoused the economic-benefit theory as applied
to employee fringe benefits, despite its accompanying denial that it did not renounce
the convenience-of-the-employer-rule. The special rulings that it rendered in 195o
(6472) and thereafter leave no doubt that the Treasury has at least seriously curtailed,
if it has not completely renounced, the convenience-of-the-employer-test. Meals and
lodging for hotel employees, ... living quarters, and meals for hospital employees
had become taxable to employees to the extent that their economic value to them was
measurable, even though the applicability of the convenience-of-employer-rule was
obvious." Landman, The Taxability of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXEs 173, 178 (1955).
1" "The policy outlined in Mimeograph 6472 was- followed by the Tax Court in
Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374 (1953). However, it was rejected by the Second Circuit
Court Last year in Diamond v. Sturr 221 F.zd 264 (2d cir. 1955), the court taking
the position that treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially re-enacted statutes, are
deemed to have received Congressional approval and- have the effect of law." Rapp,
Some Recent Devzelopments in the Concept of Taxable Income, I i TAX L. REV. 329, 346
(1956). See also Gordon v. United States, 152 F.Supp. 427 (D.C.N.J. 1957), follow-
ing the Diamond v. Sturr, supra, decision.
" Prior to the 1954 Code, the Bureau of Internal Revenue defined for the convenience
of the employer as follows: "As a general rule, the test of 'convenience of the em-
ployer' is satisfied if living quarters or meals are furnished to an employee who is
required to accept such quarters and meals in order to perform properly his duties."
Mim. 5023, 1940-I Cum. Bul. x4. See also 53 MIc . L. Rxv. 871 (1955).
18The House version of section x9 used the words, "furnished at the place of
employment." The Senate version which ultimately prevailed used the words, "on the
business premises of his employer." No substantive difference seems to have been
intended as a result of the slight change in wording. See McDermott, Meals and
Lodging Under the 1954 Code, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 871, 874, 875 (1955).
1" "The phrase 'required as a condition of employment? means required in order




was convenience of the employer.20 At this point, it seems evident that
the result in the Boykin case does not comport with the basic considera-
tions which motivated Congress to enact section i 19.
The congressional committee reports2' discussing section i 19 indicate
that it was designed to provide an exclusion for any employee required
to eat or live on the business premises for his employer's convenience.
Treasury Regulation i.i 19-I (c) (2) modified the intended result, how-
ever, by distinguishing between meals and lodging involving no reim-
bursement to the employer and those for which the employee must
reimburse his employer. This regulation may have sprung from an
erroneous interpretation of the following example, found in committee
reports from both the House22 and Senate,23 part of which was adopted
verbatim into that portion of Regulation i.1i9-I (c)(2) dealing with
cash allowances:
This section applies only to meals or lodging furnished in kind.
Therefore, any cash allowances for meals or lodging received by
an employee will continue to be includible as under existing law
to the extent that such allowances constitute compensation....
Example 2-An employee of an institution is given the choice
of residing at the institution free of charge or of residing else-
where and receiving an allowance of $30 per month in addi-
tion to regular salary. If he elects to reside at the institution,
the value to the employee of the lodging furnished by the em-
ployer will be includible in gross income because his residence
at the institution is not required as a condition of his employment.
This example ostensibly was intended only to illustrate the difference
between situations in which the employee is required to live on the
premises for the employer's convenience, and those situations in which
the employee has an option of either living on the premises or receiving
a cash allowance and living elsewhere, the latter arrangement obviously
being for the employee's convenience. The Treasury, however, may
20 "Your committee has provided that the basic test of exclusion is to be whether
the meals or lodging are furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer (and
thus excludible) or whether they are primarily for the convenience of the employee
(and therefore taxable)." S. REP. No. 16z, 83rd Cong., zd Sess. i9 (1954).
2 See xoo CONG. REC. 3423 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83 rd Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1954) S S. REP. No. 1622, 83 rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
2 S. RE1P. No. x6z, 83rd Cong., zd Sess. 1go (954).
2' H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., ±d Sess. A 3 8 (1954)-
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have interpreted the words "free of charge" to mean that the con-
venience of the employer test should not be applied in situations where
the employee is charged by the employer for meals and lodging. In
view of the context in which the words "free of charge" were used, this
negative inference is unwarranted. The crucial factor in the example is
the presence or absence of an option on the part of the employee, not
whether accommodations are furnished free of charge. Since it is
probable that a situation such as that which existed in the Boykin case
was not contemplated by the drafters of this example, there is no justifi-
cation for disposing of the Boykin case on this basis.
Both the Senate24 and House25 Reports have championed the
convenience of employer test as codified under section i 195 the Boykin
case seems to indicate that the Treasury has adopted this test as to cash
allowances. Nevertheless, as the law now stands, an employee who is
required to reimburse his employer for food and lodging out of his
regular salary is being penalized because of the way his employer keeps
his books. Since any distinction between required reimbursements, ac-
commodations involving no reimbursement, or cash allowances depends
entirely upon routine accounting entries, there appears to be no over-
riding reason why the convenience of employer test should not be
applied to required reimbursements.
2 See note 22 supra.
2 See, note 23 suPa.
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